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This paper does not address the specifics of "How to Negotiate", since
everyone has his own style of negotiating. Nor does it present a discussion
of how to survive in business, since it is assumed that most readers are
somehow able to manage this, or can pick up pointers elsewhere. It is
not a summary of substantive laws governing technology transfer in
Latin America, or of any other specific subjects (i.e., taxation, labor re-
lations, or principles of contracting). What this paper does contain are
some points which, according to my experience, are useful in negotiating
service contracts or technology transfer agreements with governments in
Latin America.
I. EVOLUTION OF THE PRESENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL COMPANIES IN
LATIN AMERICA: HOST GOVERNMENT VS TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
During the same period that transnational corporations (TNCs) ex-
perienced substantial growth, the host governments (HGs) became more
active participants and regulators of their economies, thus bringing the
HG into direct contact with the TNC. Negotiations became an important
forum in which the HG could express its dissatisfaction with and hos-
tility towards these huge enterprises, many of which had annual revenues
*This paper was first delivered to conferences attended primarily by business
executives, lawyers, and bankers in August of 1976 in Boston, New York and
Pittsburgh in a series of workshops sponsored by the Fund for Multinational Man-
agement Education and the Council of Americas. At that time the author was
engaged in the private practice of law and the views expressed herein do not
necessarily represent those of the Fund for Multinational Management Education
or the Council of the Americas.
**The author has been involved in negotiations on several levels for the last
fourteen years, with corporations and government agencies in Latin America, as
well as similar experience in Europe, Asia and West Africa. He is presently Counsel
and Director of Technical Programming at the Council of the Americas.
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several times the size of the host country GNP. Since the HG has been
generally unable to negotiate as effectively as the TNG, conflicts between
them increased.
HG antipathy toward the TNCs and increasing sophistication by
government negotiators have encouraged a trend toward "unbundling" of
technology.' This allegedly creates an opportunity for smaller and medium-
sized companies, both foreign and nationally owned, to provide some con-
stituent elements of technology at a lower cost. It also supposedly poses
less of a threat to the Latin American countries than the acquisition of the
same components from a large TNC. In addition, smaller firms sometimes
appear potentially more responsive to host country needs. HG officials
believe this unbundling trend encourages development of local technology
and expertise at specialty levels, which initially require less capital and
other resources. The administrative, logistical and re-integration costs and
efforts often defeat this objective.
Finally, many HG officials are strongly resentful of past abuses and
approach any new negotiations with a backlog of bad feelings. Regrettably,
they tend to assume such abuses apply generally to all technology transfer.
In addition, many conversations with government officials in and out of
Latin America indicate that they rely on older, less up-to-date data to docu-
ment these abuses. In particular, they cite certain research and publica-
tions by well-known economists and theoreticians of the "Third World," 2
which along with some excellent scholarship include some unsubstantiated
allegations.
I. BusINESS, CULTURAL AND GENERAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
There are a number of caveats which should be kept in mind in plan-
ning for any negotiation in Latin America, but particularly when dealing
1Also referred to as disaggregation or debundling.
2 See generally, Wionczek, La Transferencia de Tecanlogia en el Marco de la
lndustrializaci6n Mexicana, in Comercio de Tecnologia y Sub-Desarollo Econ6mico,
(M Wionczek ed. 1973); Sunkel, Big Business and Dependencia, A Latin American
View, 50 Foreign Affairs 517 (1972); Sagasti, A Framework for the Formulation
and Implementation o1 Technology Policies: A Case Study of ITINEC in Peru,
in Science, Government, and Industry for Development 203 (Ingerson & Bragg ed.
1975) ; C. Vaitsos, Employment Problems and Transnational Enterprises in Develop-
ing Countries: Distortions and Inequality (with particular reference to Andean Pact
countries), (October, 1976) (working paper-World Employment research, I.L.O.).
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with a government or quasi-governmental corporation. Although these may
appear rudimentary, they are included precisely because they have so
often contributed to widening the perceived cultural gap.
Know about legal traditions, like the Calvo doctrine, which affects
willingness to accept governing law other than that of the host country,
and precludes the possibility of the U.S. Government interceding on your
company's behalf. Examine the possibility of substituting third country
or neutral laws instead, and be familiar with differences between substan-
tive, procedural (arbitration) and "conflict" laws.
You should also be familiar with the host country's historical and
recent inflation rates and incorporate this into your planning and prices,
or clearly identify a formula to negotiate the basis for periodic adjustment.
There are many indices to which generally successful formulas have been
tried, but there are limitations in any predictive formulas.
Familiarize yourself with the political background regarding a par-
ticular country's stability. Do not make statements or generalizations about
Brazil, for example, that really apply to Peru, Argentina, or even Chile.
Each country's situation is very different and you will lose respect and
credibility by confusing one situation with another. While this may sound
obvious, such ill-conceived remarks are often made, and they never help.
Be aware of and sensitive to nationalistic trends throughout Latin
America, but particularly in the HG. Peru since 1968 has 'been a very
different place to transact business for a U.S. company than Bolivia.
Venezuela may have more money than Mexico, but it does not have the
relatively stable traditions and track record which are important to TNCs.
In each country, however, sudden changes in the government or its policy
can sharply affect the environment for foreign commerce or investment.
III. GENERAL TRENDS IMPEDING TNC ACTIVITY IN FOREIGN
INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
When negotiating a technology agreement in any Latin American
country, no one can afford to be ignorant of trends in new legislation
restricting foreign investment and technology transfer throughout the
world.3
3For Latin American examples, see: Ancom Decision 24; Transfer of Technology
Law, Law 20, 794, XXXIV-D Arrales de Legislacion Argentina 3318 of Sept. 27,
1974; Mexican Law for the Registration of Transfer of Technology and Use and
Exploitation of Patents and Trademarks of December, 1972; the more recent Law
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Nor should a company be ignorant of attacks on the multinational
corporations in the U.S. and abroad, e.g., Burke-Hartke, Jackson-Vanik,
Trade Act of 1974 and other laws and legislative proposals affecting in-
ternational trade, investment, technology transfer and finance.
One should also have at least a general awareness of (if not familiarity
with) the Codes of Conduct designed to regulate TNCs and technology
transfer proposed by: (a) United Nations Council on Trade and Develop-
ment Group of 77, ('b) Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (and prior International Commerce Commission), (c) OAS
(preliminary informal version).
IV. ORGANIZING FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
The TNC negotiation team varies with the nature of the project. In
addition to the sales or marketing person, the team should always include
a lawyer, someone who can present the detailed backup of the cost esti-
mate, and someone who can explain and respond to questions on matters
dealing with the technical approach or process. Other negotiators can be
called in as needed in order to avoid making the permanent team too
large and intimidating. The team should remain sensitive to the percep-
tion of intimidation by overwhelming numbers of foreign negotiators.
Large numbers reinforce the colossus image, which is often associated with
both U.S. corporations and the U.S. Government.
The team should spend some time together at the home office dis-
cussing strategies, fall-back positions, and roles. It is wise to spend time
in advance briefing a legal or commercial specialist to handle questions
on related subjects, rather than include another permanent member of
the team. It may also be less expensive in the long run where negotiations
drag on and on. But whatever the arrangement, have specialists on call
to explain complicated or difficult aspects of the technical approach or
process. It's costly in any case but after all this may be the unique aspect
of your proposal which gives you competitive advantage over other bidders.
Exploit that because it is your strength and it will be most reassuring to
the HG, particularly your "friends," in the face of almost inevitable criti-
cisms of the Government by opponents.
on Inventions and Trademarks of Feb. 11, 1976; Decrees 62-63, G.O. No. 1.655
Extraordinario of April 29, 1974 (Venezuela); 13 LL.M. 1220; Chilean Decree/Law
600 of July, 1974; and Brazil's INPI Normative Act No. 15 of September, 1975.
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It is important that everyone on your company team be responsive to
a single "Chief of Delegation," no matter what the home office reporting
relationships may be. You must also know who is to play the "hatchet
man" role and when that may 'be necessary. The Latin American govern-
ment agencies nearly universally respect U.S. managerial sophistication
above virtually everything else except technological superiority, and
nothing destroys that image like a disorganized and inharmonious nego-
tiating team.
. The role of the U.S. attorney in these negotiations may vary consid-
erably. Many companies prefer to keep their lawyer in the active negotia-
tions, but not as chief negotiator or spokesman. They prefer the marketing
or commercially-oriented person in that role. But most seem to rely on
their inside counsel for active participation due to his ability to: (1) fa-
miliarize himself thoroughly with the laws and tax problems, (2) analyze
the proposed structure of the transaction and advise the best approach to
minimize tax and other liabilities and exposures, (3) perform quick anal-
ysis of new problems or considerations when raised (at least with respect
to the above mentioned exposures), and (4) draft, revise, or modify lan-
guage to facilitate the accomplishment of objectives of both parties while
avoiding often encountered pitfalls.
Many companies use their attorney strictly to advise the senior man-
agement person and to control the participation by the local counsel. In
other cases he may be one of the people who remains outside the negotiat-
ing room, constantly drafting revisions of clauses or language and check-
ing local counsel on tax and other implications of new approaches being
proposed, while simultaneously providing data 'back to the home office for
its information or approval as appropriate.
On the other hand, the lawyer for the Latin American government
usually serves as a draftsman and advisor on strict matters of law and
legal procedure, and is generally more legalistic in approach and less
commercially sophisticated than his U.S. counterpart.4
There should be a designated person keeping good minutes, including
offers and counter-offers, fall-back discussions, snags, resolutions of stale-
4For an interesting comparison of the role of respective lawyers in these negoti-
ations, see Wells, Negotiating with Third World Governments, 55 Harv. Bus. Rev. 77
(1977). Industry for Development 83 (Ingerson & Bragg ed. 1975); Mayo, Science
and Technology as Development Factors, P. Gabriel, Importing Corporate Capabilities
Without Exporting Ownership and Control: Alternative to Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (1973) (paper for conference on Latin American-U.S. Economics Interactions
at the University of Texas).
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mates, and other pertinent comments. I cannot remember a single instance
wherein several disputes which arose during the execution of the project
were not resolved by referring to the negotiation notes. In one case a
rather inexperienced agency recorded absolutely everything on tape right
from the opening statements. This is unnecessary, but written summaries
of key points initialed or signed by each side can be useful.
V. PLANNING AND PREPARATION OF NEGOTIATIONS
Negotiation is not an isolated event. It takes place within a larger
context of time and space, of past experiences and present policies of the
host country pursuing its economic development goals. Therefore, it is
important for the corporate representative to know something of the
country's economic and political development (including previous business.
government relationships in that country), and its legal system (i.e., An-
dean Sectorial Development Program-petrochemical industry assign.
ments), in addition to the social and cultural background of the specific
country. Finally, it is useful to identify the nature of current tensions in
international 'business environments (such as confrontations between so-
called Group of 77 countries and Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development countries in United Nations Council on Trade and De-
velopment meetings).
The above research may well reveal why the HG may be adopting
seemingly irrational positions which compound existing frustrations.
It is frequently suggested that the essence of host country.TNC con.
flict is the issue of perceived corporate infringement of national sover-
eignty. A government of a Latin American country is dependent on the
TNC for resources and technology inputs (including training) required
for the pursuit of its national goals, both economic and social. Thus, the
HG is not free to pursue its own course without help. Yet the TNC--with
its worldwide presence, foreign control, and lack of allegiance to a single
country-is perceived as transcending the limits and interests of the host
nation.
As a result of their traditional business-government relationships,
therefore, many Latin American government officials believe that Ameri.
can TNCs work closely with their (i.e., U.S.) Government. Mere denial of
such a relationship does not change this Latin American perception, which
is founded on strong political, psychological, and emotional considerations.
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A. Conflicting Objectives
(1) Host Government Objectives The country with which you are
planning a project enters the negotiation situation with a defined set of
objectives. These normally include :
(a) Importation of technology to meet national development
goals - new industries, plants, processes, or products.
(b) Preservation of (often scarce) foreign exchange reserves.
(c) Assurance that the benefits of imported technology are
diffused throughout the economy (avoiding enclaves of
foreign influence).
(d) Massive training to improve technical skill base.
5
(e) Avoidance of overcharges for technology.
(f) Avoidance of unsuitable or irrelevant technology ("Ap-
propriate Technology" is a term now used in a specific
U.S. Government program designed to facilitate or pro-
mote transfer of relevant technology to developing na-
tions).
(g) Avoidance of undue confidentiality and restrictions on
use (the general objective is to buy or obtain outright the
technology within a short time rather than continue to pay
royalties for long periods, which places a severe burden
on foreign exchange).
(h) Generally to avoid "technological colonialism".
(2) Objectives of Technology Transfer. Objectives of the foreign
firms include some which are partially in conflict with those of the host
country:
(a) Fair return to amortize development costs-some cor-
porate research and development is directed at developing
5Note the reference to training in Art. 58, Decree 63 G.O. Na. 1.655 Extra.
ordianario of April 29, 1974 (Venezuela) 13 I.L.M. 1221, 1231. The clearly in.
dicated objective is for nations to obtain better use of acquired technology. Recent
national programs in Venezuela (Plan Mariscal de Ayacucho), as well as decrees
and proposed decrees elsewhere in Latin America reflect the need for more on-the-job
training in addition to formal technical education. High government officials speak
often of true technology transfer. See Radway, Venezu~ela: Certain Legal Considera-
tions in Doing Business, 8 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 289 (1976).
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technology for licensing. Most companies, however, receive
a larger rate of return from use of this technology in inter-
national operations.
6
(b) Protection of property rights - the technology, whether
or not protected under U.S. or foreign patent legislation,
constitutes industrial property. Companies, therefore, insist
upon confidentiality, non-disclosure of proprietary infor-
mation, patent and trademark protection where available
and appropriate7 and whatever else may be necessary to
prevent competitors from unfairly capitalizing on their
technology without sharing in the tremendous development
costs. 8
(c) Maintain reputation and competitive standing -obviously,
a company's credibility is on the line with the technology
it has developed and transferred. It therefore seeks ex-
changes of improvements and licensor's rights to inspect
facilities after construction and during a plant's early
operation, 9 and technical assistance and start-up assistance
agreements in order to de-bug new plants or systems and
assure satisfactory start-up and initial operation. The com-
pany has to be satisfied with the quality control and
quality level of the product which bears its internationally
known trademark.
B. Technology Life Cycle and Shilting Relative Strength
Analogous to an investment life cycle is a technology life cycle. Just
as the value of foreign investment diminishes over time from its initially
high level, so too does the value of transferred technology. As one author
expresses it, "the contractual and ownership rights of the international
corporation will be honored by the HG only as long as it feels that in
6Evans, Technology Transfer to the ANCOM Countries: The View of One U.S.
Corporation, The Andean Common Market: Management Implications of Application
of Technology Legislation (1976); Dull, Transfer of Technology to Latin America -
a U.S. Corporate View, Technology Transfer and Development: an Historical and
Geographic Perspective (Driscoll & Wallender, eds. 1974).
71t is well known that many companies are disinclined to obtain patent coverage
on certain types of processes and other know-how, electing rather to protect it by
"secrecy agreements" and avoid the inherent limitations of the patent system.
SEvans, supra note 6.
91d.
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balance the country is gaining."'10 The foreign firm must therefore plan
for the eventuality that after the technology is transferred, its control will
necessarily diminish and ultimately disappear.
Initially, the transferor stands in a relatively stronger position than
the host country because it has what the HG wants. Presumably, the par-
ticular technology has been evaluated according to an international com-
petition or bid process and judged to be unique, or at least comparatively
superior to anything locally available. Gradually, however, there is a
shift in relative negotiating strengths, away from the TNC and in favor
of the HG. In this process the political effects and social ramifications
become more important than the economics of the transfer project.
One valuable technique used to maintain the foreign firm's strength
is the periodic infusion of improved technology or other resources via a
license agreement, joint-venture, or similar technology transfer agreement."
If the company takes great care to transfer only that technology that can
be used at the outset, it should also facilitate periodic infusions of higher
technology as the local economy develops the capability to absorb it.
In addition, the strategic use of informational publicity to counteract
unfounded allegations or attacks, as well as to announce new develop-
ments, can help the TNC maintain its relative strength vis-a-vis the host
government.
VI. CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATOR
A. Political
(1) Authority and Authorization. A prerequisite for negotiating
with a Latin American government is to find out in advance who the
decision maker is and what limits exist to his authority. The next step is
to find out whom to contact on a higher level to resolve sticky snags that
stem from personality or inexperience, not from substance. This contact
should be exercised only by the TNC's chief of delegation or agent. as
appropriate, but it certainly should -be utilized whenever necessary. These
higher officials often appreciate outside -views on the progress of the
negotiations.
10A. Kapoor, International Business Negotiations: Characteristics and Planning
Implications, NYU Graduate School of Business Administration, at 31.
111d. at 220.
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(2) Friends & Foes. In cases where your company has been the
successful bidder in a tight competition, ascertain who favored your firm
and who favored your opposition. The loser never seems to have "lost"
until the project is complete. Keep an eye on the "Friends and Foes", as
well as on activities of your closest competition, even after the bid has
supposedly been "awarded" by the appropriate Purchasing Committee,
Ministry or other organization. They may be waiting in the wings and
ready to move in if you falter, a fact which has been used for leverage
by the HG spokesman in some situations. Worse yet, if the competition
is better connected than your company, this may have an effect on the
behavior of the HG Chief Negotiator during negotiations.
In addition, look for an antagonist on the HG side and ascertain
whether he may be speaking for or representing the "Foes" (i.e., your
competitors). Do not lose patience with him; be responsive to his some-
times trivial and irrelevant questions, and give him plenty of rope-he will
probably hang himself! It is quite likely that he does not speak for the
majority.
(3) Societal. Keep close surveillance on local and national tensions
in respect of North Americans and U.S. investors in particular. Negotia.
tions or progress on a project can be affected by these, since your com-
pany could become a convenient scapegoat for prior actions of others.
B. Procedural
In addition to the political constraints already mentioned, there is
the consideration of the status or role of the HG's chief negotiator within
his own ministry. This role sometimes changes during the negotiations or
the project.
Everyone who has negotiated in Latin America is aware of the im-
portance of knowing the HG negotiator as an individual. The personal
relationship cannot be over-emphasized in these countries. Getting to know
those with whom you are dealing is a long and often arduous process.
Social and class distinctions often impede this process, yet they are not
easily recognized by the inexperienced negotiator.
Preparation also involves knowing not only who your competition is
but also what they offer. Do not hesitate to ask the HG negotiator about
them. In service contracts developed through intense competition, many
U.S. companies prepare engineering breakdowns of the competing proc-
esses (both technical and economic), and spend considerable time, effort
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and expense carefully examining the percentage of local sourcing they can
use and the nature, extent and location of the training which can be
included.
Finally, you must know the content of the Supreme Decree or other
legal authorization for the HG to enter into negotiations. This may dis-
close critical constraints, including deadlines, for the HG to conclude
negotiations.
C. Substantive
In addition to the contents of the Supreme Decree, where there are
bidding documents involved the negotiators should re-read the legal and
commercial terms prior to the negotiations to review legal constraints on
the HG. These have probably been established by the appropriate planning
or procurement committee and are very likely to be firm, at least at the
outset. But they should be studied carefully to identify those areas the
TNC cannot live with; these should be taken up in private at a high
level meeting. The problem areas should be discussed as openly and
candidly as possible with the decision maker.
Other critical constraints on the HG are the substantive laws govern-
ing the transaction or project. It goes without saying that the foreign firm
should have spent time and effort with its local counsel in advance,
familiarizing itself as much as possible with those laws.
VII. CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS
A time-honored rule of thumb is to avoid the necessity of the HG
negotiator having to lose face. 'Flexibility is therefore required at all stages.
The test for the foreign company is, "Can we live with it?" If the answer
is even a hesitant "yes", and if risk does not outweigh payoff potential,
then consider adaptation to the known constraints of the HG negotiator.
Closely akin to the "face" problem is the educational problem. Some
government agencies in certain Latin American countries have a wealth of
experience in dealing with TNCs and have confidence in their objectives
and how to attain them. Other agencies, even in the same government,
are totally inexperienced and require generous and frequent doses of
patience, education, information, more patience, MAALOX, frequent in-
formal contact at all levels, both socially and in private meetings, and
still more patience.
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VIII. WHERE LEGAL PROBLEMS ARISE IN NEGOTIATIONS
Legal problems frequently arise from current business or economic
factors such as shifts in supply and demand curves (not only oil boycott,
but oil-based inflation affecting prices and availability of equipment and
materials), revaluation or devaluation of the U.S. or HG currency or the
currency of a major competitor, and the effect of weather on crop yields
with resultant effect on prices and the economy generally. All these factors
influence prices and costs, and therefore profit, to each party. At least one
party will be insured and the possibility of a claim will arise.
Legal problems also arise from the competitive environment (price
cuts in response to competition, or corresponding "add-ons" which in-
crease cost). Negotiators should try to avoid giving unilateral concessions
("freebies"), since there are numerous examples of these items subse-
quently being eliminated when project costs exceed original estimates, and
a responsible project manager or engineer (who was not in the original
negotiations) applies a cost-benefit analysis.
IX. ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL CONFLICT AREAS IN ADVANCE
This obviously requires preparation. Some TNCs which negotiate
on an almost daily basis all over the world have fairly well defined sys-
tems and steps to complete before each negotiation, based on their unique
needs and perspectives. Opinions vary on the advisability or usefulness of
a negotiation procedure, but some companies report good results with
it despite its inherent limitations.
Once most of the potential conflicts have been anticipated, informal
negotiations can be initiated -along with the more formal one. Either prior
to or concurrent with formal negotiations, the lawyers from each side
should talk to each other, the accountants to each other, the technical
people likewise (further broken down within specific technical disciplines)
and the marketing or commercial people. Each individual should know
what his counterpart wants and try to reach an agreement with him on
a one-to-one basis as much as possible. This builds and maximizes per.
sonal relationships, taking advantage of maximum intra-disciplinary
credibility, and reducing risks of spoilage by "bad actors" who often
create antipathy outside their field of competence. I am reminded of an
example in a negotiation with a newly organized Bolivian agency wherein
credibility with a bright young engineer evolved and was cultivated by an
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older well-experienced engineer on our team. When this able young engi.
neer became technical manager (within a few months) the conclusion of
negotiations was accelerated.
A. Tradition, Law, and Custom
Local tax laws in the Latin American country affect the profitability
of a project. Particularly when negotiating service contracts, it is im-
portant for the TNC to determine in advance who is subject to which
taxes. This should be carefully examined with local counsel to learn of
the precedents. Mexico, for example, has granted rulings (like Revenue
Rulings) creating different tax treatment based on the character of the
legal entity. If this would reduce costs which would otherwise be grossed.
up, it should be to everyone's advantage to know about it. Several countries
grant exemptions in the form of decrees governing specific projects or
specific industries.
An example of this occurred in Chile. A decree was passed granting
tax exemptions for copper-mining projects. When the government in power
later changed, the Internal Taxation (revenue) Department revoked the
exemption and the contractor was hit with a twelve million dollar tax
liability. Through several years of litigation and another change of gov-
ernment, during which a written assumption by the HG agency of any
potential tax liability to be imposed was obtained, this case was finally
won on appeal at the Supreme Court level. These written assumptions of
liability or indemnification agreements from the HG are particularly
helpful, whether they are in the contract or in a side letter.
Another matter to be considered is whether a contractor may be
reimbursed by the owner for corporate income taxes levied by the HG.
Compare Mexico (yes) with Venezuela (no). But the trend is away from
the Mexican position and towards the Venezuelan; in these cases it should
be grossed-up in the proposal.
In this connection the complicated subject of U.S. Foreign Tax
Credits (FTC) frequently arises. It has become quite clear that techni.
cians in several Latin American Government agencies have some knowl-
edge of the existence of the FTC, but do not understand its qualifications
and limitations.
2
i2 See, Camp and Rojas, Recent Developments Under the Mexican Foreign In-
vestment Law and the Law Regulating the Transfer of Technology 8 Law. Am. 1,
24 (1976). The author was a member of the U.S. Task Force and recalls vividly the
mistaken impressions held by the distinguished officials of "Impuestos Internos",
concerning the application of the FTC mechanism. I have also been involved with
very able counsel in several countries who held similarly mistaken views.
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Each firm should examine possibilities of stamp tax exemptions and
reductions. Several experiences are recalled (Bolivia, Venezuela, Mexico,
and others) where the HG agency paid this tax. But there are other
examples (even in those same countries) where the contractor will be
specifically responsible for the tax and it must be identified in the esti-
mate. When they won't pay or grant an exemption, one should consider
asking for tax reductions due to the priority status of the project. Check
with local counsel for precedent.
Taxation and other problems also arise where equipment importation
is involved. In addition, delays arising from customs clearance have an
impact on schedules. Other costs can accumulate from consular fees and
a host of other miscellaneous bureaucratic burdens. It is best to provide
for reimbursement of all these in the tax clause by express language.
Equipment re-export problems invariably emerge when improper classifi-
cation is assigned upon importation. Finally, problems exist in some
countries where personnel assigned to a project or merely present for ne-
gotiations are subject to demands for unpaid personal income tax at the
airport upon departure, payment for which should have been previously
arranged. This highlights the importance of cultivating good personal
relationships with the HG officials and selecting good local counsel to keep
you aware of these potential exposures.
B. Escalation of Costs and Financing
Recent inflation rates in Brazil (40-45%), Argentina (300-400%),
Chile (1000% in recent years, down to about 180% in 1976 and 90%
predicted for 1977), and other Latin American countries necessitate in-
clusion of provisions to protect against escalation due to inflation. For
example, when an Export-Import Bank loan is involved, inflation may
cause cost increases subsequent to preparation of estimates. Yet at this
time in the negotiations commitments from some suppliers are not yet
firm. How do you protect against this? Many HGs have a policy against
escalation clauses. They have been burned too often and a general feeling
exists that contractors submit low bids and recover on extras and escalation
formulas. A separate clause for this purpose is recommended; when sepa-
rately identified, it is much easier to enforce. But, as it raises the red
flag, it is much more difficult to negotiate.
The alternative is to add escalation language to a Force Majeure
(Caso Fortuito) Clause. However, several Civil Code provisions in Latin
America on this subject are severely limiting, and many HG agencies
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insist on using their civil code provision for the contract clause. Thus,
you might not be permitted to modify the language. In addition, there is
a split in the legal community about whether escalation language in a
Force Majeure clause is enforceable. Some argue that since it is outside
the traditional objective of that clause (impossibility of performance),
the addition of escalation language creates a hybrid clause and lessens
the probability of such clause as modified being upheld upon the bringing
of a proper challenge.
C. Enforcing Agreements with HGs Generally
Another problem exists with respect to enforceability upon succession
of government. It is suggested that the contract bind the State, not the
Government, even though a successor may choose not to honor it. One
should always consult local counsel on the tradition and precedent to
avoid or minimize conflicts as much as possible. It is likely that your
degree of success may be a function of the importance of your project to
the economy.
D. Claims, Disputes, and Arbitration
U.S. companies are frequently reluctant to sue a HG in its own
courts due to Calvo traditions and the political environment, but this
should be a very acceptable option in some cases. Local counsel should
always be consulted for history of fairness' in that country. In addition,
some HG agencies will now accept some provisions for dispute settlement
in neutral third countries. Some considerations with respect to arbitration
that both parties will want to examine 3 include:
(a) Choice of Agency or Institution (American Arbitration Asso-
ciation, International Chamber of Commerce, International Con.
vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Inter-America
Commercial Arbitration Commission) and set of rules and pro.
cedures to be followed
(b) Costs and associated delays
(c) Choice of Law and
(d) Enforceability of arbitral award in host country and in the
U.S.A.
13See generally, The Future of Arbitration in Latin America; A Study of its
Regional Development, 8 Case W. Res. J. Int'l Law 480 (1976).
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Much greater care should be taken in drafting the "agreement to
submit Future Dispute to Arbitration" (arbitration clause), for many
lawyers believe the trend is finally in that direction. t4
X. SOME GENERAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although this is not a treatment of the substantive laws involved,
some issues should be addressed in preparation for the negotiations since
they are favorite subjects of most HGs herein discussed. They include:
(a) Currency Choice -This is self-explanatory and should not pose
a problem in hard currency countries.
(b) Mandatory local partner-Venezuelan Decree 62 would preempt
a 100% Foreign Owned Company in the engineering services
sector from performing a feasibility study or project, but Dr.
Rafael Soto Alvarez of Superintendency of Foreign Investments
(SIEX) has indicated that they will approve joint ventures for
this purpose.15 This subject is increasingly popular.
(c) New foreign investment and technology transfer laws16 raise
serious difficulties with certain subjects including the following:
(1) The Mexican trademark law raises some interesting ques-
tions about protecting individual property rights.
(2) Know-how and trade secrets are "intellectual property"-
the owner may keep information confidential or transmit
it to another for a fee while obligating the recipient to keep
it secret. Unless intellectual property rights are enforced
companies have less incentive to perform research and de-
velopment since competitors may obtain valuable property
without paying for its development. In this context it is
14The author is scheduled to present a paper on Arbitration in Latin America
in the context of Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer in May, 1977 at the
meeting of the Inter American Bar Association in Atlanta, Georgia. Many of these
concepts are in a transitional state at this time.
15Radway, supra note 5, at 297.
16See generally: for Brazil, Pinheiro Neto, Multinationals in Brazil 8 Case W.
Res. J. Int'l L. 311 (1972) ; for Mexico, Camp and Rojas, supra note 13; Hyde and
Ramirez, Mexico's New Transfer of Technology and Foreign Investment Laws - To
What Extent Have the Rules Changed, 10 Int'l Law 231 (1976); Perez Vargas,
Revised Mexican Law on inventions and Marks - A Mexican Perspective, 66 Trade-
mark Rep. 188 (1976); for Venezuela, Radway, supra note 5.
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appropriate to note the increased interest by HGs to locate
TNC research facilities in their countries.
(3) Relation between duration and confidentiality-there is a
conflict between transferors and Latin American HGs on
this issue. It is strongly suggested that U.S. companies stand
firm on their longer term agreement requirements, as this
question appears to have a bearing upon the reason for U.S.
technological superiority (,the top technology official in
Venezuela claims they limit the term to five years in order
to stimulate improvements, innovations, and developments).
TNCs have thus far demanded greater protection.
(4) The laws limiting profits and royalties provide no distinc-
tion for uniqueness of technology. This is left to the gov-
ernment officials who must apply them. It could conceivably
result in a series of agreements for technical assistance,
management assistance, systems design, operations analysis,
inventory control systems, etc. In other words companies
could structure the transaction by acquiescing to the "un-
bundling" demands, and then design each element in such
a way that it can bring in total the fair return that can
be justified on the project.
(5) Fade-out and other similar provisions do not specifically
apply unless the transaction involves licensing and affiliate,
but they should be interpreted as representing a distinct
trend. SIEX's position is that the TNC may deduct license
royalties paid to a foreign parent if the local affiliate fades
down to 49%.
(6) Training-the key element of know-how in technology
transfer. The Venezuelan Ayacucho Plan is only a begin-
ning. They need on-the-job training in Venezuela, but that
is difficult. 17 They really need arrangements with TNCs to
train in the United States and this can be a bargaining
item for exchange in the negotiations.
(7) The "Mexicanization Principles," which call for preference
for local suppliers, should be examined carefully, as they
apparently carry a different meaning in different countries.
l
7
See note 5 supra.
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The TNC should be prepared to justify imports against a
local manufacturer who claims he can produce the item and
then proceeds to block the import license approval in the
appropriate HG agency.
XI. USE OF THIRD PARTIES DURING NEGOTIATIONS
There is a considerable range of views on the use of third parties in
or during the negotiations, despite their employment before (in the bid-
ding or pre-sale stages) and after (during project execution). It should
be noted that third parties include local counsel, local accountants or
auditors, bankers, and consultants, in addition to an agent or representa-
tive. Many companies use local counsel as discussed earlier. The useful-
ness of an Agent (representative) will very likely be a function of his
technical knowledge and/or his credibility with the HG. He can be helpful
when an impasse arises, simply by trying to discuss the problem on a
level which precludes introduction of nationalistic arguments or positions,
which should obviously be avoided at all costs. The agent may be helpful
also in accompanying your chief negotiator or the decision maker to the
Ministry (for introductions, protocol), or simply as a national who should
be sensitive to such otherwise obvious matters as whether the Minister (or
Deputy) is being imposed upon if the meeting runs too 'long, or as a some-
times more objective sounding board.
It should be mentioned that one of the most effective uses of any
third party I have ever witnessed involved contact by the U.S. transferor
directly with key Registry officials during a negotiation with a local
proposed transferee. Because of prior acquaintance with these officials
(efforts for which are strongly urged), the U.S. company was able to go
to the source to eliminate the bogey which the local unaffiliated company
attempted to interiect.18
Finally, the use of outside consultants with appropriate credentials
has been very useful in highly technical negotiation;. This provides ad-
ditional credibility and can easily justify the additional expense if it ac-
celerates negotiations by improving the psychological climate.
l8Task Forces to certain Latin American countries have been organized by the
Council of the Americas at the request of those HGs, which has provided an
excellent opportunity to become acquainted with these Registry Officials. See, Camp
and Rojas, supra note 12, at 22.
300 LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
XII. CONCLUSION
Alleged inequality of bargaining power is often cited as a major
reason for developments within the proposed "New International Economic
Order," such as commodity agreements, which are further rationalized by
some in Latin America as promotng solidarity among developing nations.
In fact the ground rules are clearly changing and negotiations for tech-
nology and service agreements are far more complex than in the past.
There is a need for more information to be presented, and a requirement
to be aware of a broader range of considerations beyond the straight
economics of the.project. It is hoped that the results of the experiences dis-
cussed herein will prove useful in dealing with this changing environment.
